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CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
John F. Partridge*
T HE PRINCIPLES of corporation finance are a matter of concern
to the lawyer, the accountant, and the business man alike.
The field is a broad one, and an adequate discussion of the subject
in all its ramifications would require several volumes. It is pos-
sible, however, within the space of a single article, to draw atten-
tion to some of the preliminary problems involved in designing
the capital structure of a new corporation as well as to suggest
certain standards and principles which should be observed. It is
also possible to investigate the actual or probable status of various
capital structure devices which may be adopted in relation to
applicable Illinois law. One leading authority, discussing the
formation of new corporations, comments that:
The principal of these preliminary questions are the situs,
the name, the purposes and the financial structure of the
proposed corporation. Although these are, theoretically,
business questions, for decision by the client alone, yet, know-
ing the general aims of the client, the burden of explanation
and decision will be upon the attorney, for he knows best the
arguments that lie back of each decision. His will be the duty
B. S. in Bus. Admin., University of Florida; C. P. A., Illinois.
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of advising the client, clearly and in an elementary way, what
the questions are which must be decided and of leading the
client's mind to a satisfactory decision on the policy involved
in each particular question.'
This article will have served its purpose, then, if it enables the
lawyer to advise his clients, within the limitations of the above
quotation, regarding the capital structure for a corporation to be
organized in Illinois.
At the very outset, of course, the lawyer has an obligation to
his clients to give proper consideration to the suitability or un-
suitability of the corporate form to the undertaking in view of the
more extended regulation of the corporate form of business or-
ganization in comparison to others. 2 Of the many special qualities
conferred on corporations by law, the most important are the
limited liability of the owners of the business, 3 the permanence of
the business organization,4 and the ease of transferring ownership.
For many small businesses, however, the price exacted for these
special favors is too high. The expense and the paper work
required are not inconsiderable ;5 registration under the so-called
"Blue Sky" law may be necessary in connection with the original
issuance of securities ;6 reports must be made periodically to the
1 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm. Ed., Vol. 19, § 8862.
The characteristics and relative advantages of the business unit employing the
sole proprietorship or partnership form of organization are well known. Whenever
they exist, the taxes and the legal "red tape" which attend the corporate form of
organization will be sufficiently disadvantageous to bar use of the latter. See
Guthmann and Dougall, "Corporate Financial Policy" (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New
York, 1940), p. 25, and note in 34 Domestic Commerce, pp. 8-12.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.23.
4 Ibid., § 157.5(a).
5 In addition to the legal, accounting, and other non-statutory expenses involved.
the present law of Illinois exacts a filing fee for filing the certificate of incorpora-
tion (Ili. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.127), an initial license fee equal to 1/20th
of 1% of the initial paid capital (Ibid., § 157.130), and an initial franchise tax
(Ibid., § 157.133).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 121%, § 99(A) (10) and § 99(B), exempt pre-incorpora-
tion stock subscriptions or sales from registration if (1) the number of such
subscribers does not exceed twenty-five without regard to the amount of capital
raised, or if (2) the amount of capital to be raised does not exceed $25,000 regard-
less of the number of subscribers. To justify exemption, however, there must be
no expense incurred in connection with the sale of the securities. The Secretary of
State is empowered to require a registration in the event of fraud or unfairness in
such exempt sales.
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state of incorporation ;7 formality is required in all corporate
matters; special authority must be obtained before undertaking
regular business in a foreign state ;8 and the powers which may
be exercised are limited to those granted by the state.9 Most
onerous of all, special taxes are imposed which less formal business
organizations escape for, in addition to the charges made by the
state at the time of incorporation, ° there are many fees and taxes
payable annually or upon the filing of various documents or upon
other events, 1 and if the corporation is transacting business in
another state there are additional charges payable to that state as
well as additional reports to be filed.12
The impact of Federal income tax laws since 1936 must also
be taken into consideration. Income taxed once as income to the
corporation is again taxed as income to the shareholder when he
receives a dividend, the shareholder being allowed to take no credit
for the tax paid by the corporation. 13  At the rates effective in
1946, a corporation which earns $50,000 or more must pay a 38%
income tax.14  If the remaining 62% of such income is then dis-
tributed as dividends, each shareholder will be taxed on his divi-
dend just as on any other income. 5 Even if the corporate net
income, after taxes, is retained, the personal income tax of its
shareholders as to such retained earnings is merely deferred until
distribution either in the form of dividends or upon liquidation.'6
7 See "Brief Analysis of the Administrative Provisions of the Business Corpora-
tion Act and Suggestions with Respect Thereto, 1945" compiled by Edward J.
Barrett, Secretary of State, Illinois, particularly pp. 16-18.
s The requirements imposed on a foreign corporation seeking to be licensed to do
business in Illinois are set forth in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, §§ 157.102 to 157.125,
inclusive.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.5.
10 Ibid., § 157.126, § 157.134, and § 157.141.
11 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.126 to § 157.134, and also
§ 157.141.
12 Requirements imposed on a foreign corporation after being licensed to do busi-
ness in Illinois may be found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, §§ 157.102 to 157.125,
and §§ 157.135 to 157.142.
13 See May, "Corporate Structures and Federal Income Taxation," 22 Harv. Bus.
Rev., pp. 10-8 (1943), for an interesting historical survey of the influence of income
taxation on the capital structure of corporations both in England and in the
United States.
14 26 U. S. C. A. § 13 and § 15.
15 Ibid., § 22(a).
1 Ibid., § 115.
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Such double taxation exacts a high premium for the benefits of
the corporate form of organization, for while single proprietors
or partners pay taxes on the business income at the individual
rates for the year in which the income accrues to the business, 17
they escape entirely the 38% tax penalty imposed on corpo-
rations.' 8
Despite the burdens placed upon the corporate form of busi-
ness organization, it will ordinarily be found the most satisfactory
form for all but the small personalized business. If the decision
to incorporate has been reached, the lawyer is then faced with the
problem of eliminating as many of the special corporate burdens
as possible or else of reducing the impact of those that cannot be
eliminated.
I. FACTORS INFLUENCING CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
A. BUSINESS FACTORS
Capital structure should never "just happen." The future
success of the new corporation may be profoundly affected by the
design of its capital set-up. Sound business judgment and fore-
sight must be brought into play in order to avoid serious difficulties
which may impede future operations and expansion. The lawyer
cannot be expected to be an expert in all matters bearing on the
design of the corporate capital structure but, when advised by
the organizer as to the business purposes, by the accountant with
regard to the financial needs to accomplish these purposes, and
by the banker as to the economic environment in which the business
will operate and the conditions then prevailing in the capital
market, he should be able to show his client what types of securities
permitted by the law will best overcome the special problems and
attain the desired ends.
Three main factors influence the form of capitalization of new
17 Ibid., § 182.
18 There has been talk recently of the alleviation or removal of this double taxa-
tion from the Federal tax system. It is probable that some relief will be provided in
future years, but it is not likely that corporations will ever escape some income
tax disadvantage. The provisions of the income tax law are, therefore, an im-
portant factor influencing the design of the capital structure of a corporation.
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corporations. The first, and most important, is the business pur-
pose of the organizer. The second concerns the economic environ-
ment in which the business will operate. The third calls for
recognition of the limitations imposed by corporation law. Basic
business purposes sought to be achieved by the design of the
capital structure of a new corporation are more or less uniform
in every instance. They involve (1) the retention for the organ-
izers of as much profit as possible; (2) the securing of control in
the organizer's hands; (3) the exercising of economy in acquiring
the initial capital; and (4) the incorporation of flexibility into the
capital structure so that additional capital may be obtained
economically when needed for expansion. Since these are the
ends to be attained, the question becomes one as to how they can
be achieved under the law of Illinois.
B. STATUTORY FACTORS
The Business Corporation Act 19 and the Securities Law20 con-
tain various provisions which, on cursory reading, appear to limit
the plans for the proposed capital structure.21  Upon further
study, however, it will be found that, in the main, these provisions
go more to procedure that to substance, while those requirements
which appear to express substantive limitations merely invite the
lawyer to use his ingenuity.
Section 28 of the Business Corporation Act, for example,
restates a provision of the Illinois Constitution to the effect that
each "outstanding share, regardless of class, shall be entitled to
one vote on each matter submitted to a vote at a meeting of share-
holders." 22 Such language would appear to prohibit the dis-
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.1, et seq.
20 Ibid., Ch. 121%, §§ 96-137.
21 Thus Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.14 and § 157.28, require that all shares
shall have the right to vote; § 157.17 declares that shares having a par value shall
not be issued for less than par value; § 157.18 imposes the restriction that neither
promissory notes nor future services may constitute payment for shares of stock;
§ 157.47(1) requires that the initial consideration received by the corporation for
its stock before it shall commence business must be not less than $1000; and
§ 157.46 insists that there be at least three subscribers to stock to act as in-
corporators.
22 II1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.28. Compare with Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI,
58.
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enfranchising of any class of stock. For all practical purposes,
however, the same result can be achieved in this state as is
accomplished elsewhere where only one class of stock must neces-
sarily be voting stock. Nothing in the Illinois act, by express
interdiction, would prevent the issuance of $100 par value pre-
ferred stock to those who want security of income but are not
interested in taking active part in the management, while no par
common stock may be issued to the promoters for a consideration
as small as one penny per share. Under such a capital set-up,
$100 invested in the preferred stock would buy one vote, while a
like amount invested in the common stock would buy 10,000 votes.23
In form, all stock is voting, yet the preferred stock has no real
voting power in the corporate affairs. The extremes used in this
illustration, perhaps, go beyond good conscience and it is possible
that the Securities Department might deem such a combination to
be fraudulent per se. Moreover, the stock transfer tax applicable
to the "penny shares" would be prohibitive.2 4 The illustration,
therefore, is not intended to imply that the combination of securi-
ties described would be allowed by the administrative agencies in
Illinois, but merely to point out that a reasonable combination of
securities of this sort, made in good faith and with full disclosure,
is not a violation of the constitutional and statutory prohibition
of the issuance of non-voting stock.
Section 17 of the Business Corporation Act2 5 requires that
shares having a par value shall not be issued for less than the par
value thereof. But, under Section 18, shares may be issued for
services or for property, tangible or intangible, and "in the
absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the
23 Ill. Opin. Atty. Gen., 1939, No. 81, p. 235 at 236, states, in part: "I can find
nothing in section 14 of the Business Corporation Act or in section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution of 1870 which prohibits a classification of shares of stock ac-
cording to the extent in which they may participate in prospective dividends. We
cannot write into the Constitution or the Statute a proviso that shareholders shall
have the privilege of voting according to their contribution to the common fund."
24 While the federal stamp tax, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1802 (a), on the penny shares
would amount to only three cents on each $20 of actual value or fraction thereof,
the tax on reissues, sales or transfers of these shares, ibid., § 1802(b), would be
five cents per share or five times the Initial consideration per share in the extreme
situation used to illustrate the point made. The transfer tax in this situation
would operate as a practical restraint on alienation of such shares.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.17.
CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
board of directors or the shareholders, as the case may be, as to
the value of the consideration received for shares shall be con-
clusive." 26 Thus, if the transaction is without fraud, there would
appear to be nothing illegal in the issuance of a block of par value
stock to an inventor-promoter in consideration for his patent,
followed by a surrender to the new corporation, as a gift, of a
part of the stock so received. The corporation could then sell the
stock thus received as treasury stock for less than its par value.2 7
Relative rights between the various classes of stock, such as
the right to share in profits or in liquidation, to vote, providing
that all shares have the right to vote, and other special contract
rights, may be made the subject of almost any combination under
the Illinois Business Corporation Act.28 The only real limitations
upon the imagination of the attorney, when fixing these relative
rights, are (1) what can be sold, i. e. what relatively less favorable
rights will be acceptable to the purchaser; (2) the promoter's
and the lawyer's liability in fraud if there is less than full dis-
closure; and (3) the limitations which may be made by the Illinois
Securities Department at its discretion if the securities must be
registered under the "Blue Sky" law.
Sales of stock in a proposed corporation prior to its incorpora-
tion must be qualified under the provisions of the Illinois Securities
Law unless such sales are effected without expense and without
payment of commissions and unless either (1) the number of
subscribers does not exceed twenty-five, or (2) the amount to be
raised does not exceed $25,000.29 Pre-incorporation sale of securi-
ties when these conditions are not met, or the sale of securities
after the organization of a corporation has been completed to
anyone not already a shareholder, must be handled in conformity
with that statute. For the small corporation, this may prove
expensive and time-consuming as, in addition to audited state-
26 Ibid., § 15T.18.
27 Even before the provisions of the third paragraph of Section 17 of the present
Business Corporation Act were adopted, the same rule was laid down in Pullman
v. R'y Equipment Co., 73 111. App. 313 (1898). A transaction of this sort would
doubtless be examined carefully and would not be upheld unless it was free of
any trace of fraud.
28 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, §§ 157.14-157.15.
29 Ibid., Ch. 121Y2, § 99(A) (10).
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ments, independent appraisals, and the like required thereby, the
Secretary of State has broad discretionary powers to make special
investigations at the issuer's expense3 0 Securities to be issued
for intangibles must be placed in escrow and subordinated to the
interests of all other securities for at least five years,31 as the
statute goes beyond requiring full disclosure to the prospective
purchaser of the securities in seeking to protect him from his own
gullibility. Failure to comply with the statute, where necessary,
is not excused by either a showing of good faith on. the part of the
seller or that the buyer bought with full knowledge of the facts
and circumstances ;32 is punishable by fine and imprisonment; and
the security purchaser may treat his purchase as void and recover
the consideration paid.33
If the securities to be issued exceed $300,000 in value and are
to be publicly offered outside of the state of incorporation, the
issuing corporation must also comply with certain federal laws.
34
Such securities must be registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, an expensive and time-consuming process,
and a detailed prospectus must be prepared and delivered to each
prospective purchaser of the securities.3 5  Liability for failure to
comply with the federal requirements, or for misleading statements
in the prospectus, extends to the issuing corporation, to the officers
and directors thereof, to the accountants, engineers, appraisers,
etc., who may certify to any part of the registration statement,
as well as to each participating underwriter.36 In case of bond
issues in excess of one million dollars, 7 the provisions of the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 must also be complied with.88 The
underlying philosophy of laws of this character may best be illus-
3o Ibid., Ch. 121 %, §§99(B), 101(3), 102(b) (4), 104(16), 106, and 112, especially,
and most of the other sections, give the Secretary of State a very wide discretion
in administering the law.
31 Ibid., Ch. 121%, § 107.
32 Wehrwein v. Eastman Springs Beverage Co., 238 Ii. App. 443 (1925). See
Watson, "The Illinois and Federal Securities Act", 29 Iii. L. Rev. 41 (1934).
33 Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 121%, §§ 125 and 132.
34 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c.
35 Ibid., §§ 77e, 77f, 77j, and 77aa.
36 Ibid., §§ 77k and 77x.
37 Ibid., § 77ddd.
38 Ibid., § 77aaa et seq.
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trated by a statement made by the late President Roosevelt at the
time the federal legislation was under consideration. He said:
"It changes the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor to 'let the
seller beware,' and puts the burden on the seller rather than on
the buyer.' "9 It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to
discuss the varied federal laws which may affect the selling of
corporate securities in interstate commerce, so if the size of the
issue and the manner of its distribution fall within these statutes,
advice from lawyers specializing in this highly complex field is
desirable.
Within the framework of these statutory limitations, it is now
possible to consider how to plan a corporate capital structure so
as to serve the four basic purposes of the organizer of a new
corporation. As needs will vary, it is impossible to treat with a
specific situation, but the following points should be kept in mind.
II. DESIGNING THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
A. RETENTION OF PROFIT
The organizers of a new corporation are interested in giving
up as little of the prospective profits of the business as possible
to outside capital and to the government in the form of taxes.
Oddly enough, the present Federal income tax law provides an
inducement to raise capital by borrowing, rather than by the sale
of stock, thereby running counter to social policy and to sound
principles of corporate finance.40 Interest, whether on bank loans,
bonds, or other debt is deductible, just as any other business ex-
pense, in determining the corporate "net income" upon which
the income tax is computed.41 Dividends on preferred or common
stock, on the other hand, are not so deductible.
With this fact in mind, suppose Corporation "A" will re-
quire $1,000,000 working capital and is in a position to raise that
39 "The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Vol. II: The Year
of Crisis, 1933," (Random House, New York, 1938), p. 94.
40 May, "Corporate Structures and Federal Income Taxation," 22 Harv. Bus.
Rev., pp. 10-8 (1943).
41 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(a) (b).
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amount either by issuing 4% bonds or by issuing 4% preferred
stock. Assuming that its annual net income before servicing the
bonds or the stock, as the case may be, will amount to $200,000
and that the 38% corporate income tax rate,42 existing in 1946,
will apply, there is an annual pecuniary advantage to the com-
mon stockholders of $15,200 from the issuance of bonds rather
than preferred stock. That advantage is calculated as follows:
If Preferred Stock If Bonds
Issued Issued
Net Income before Interest or
Dividends ................. $200,000.00 $200,000.00
Bond Interest ................ none 40,000.00
Net Income Subject to In-
come Tax .............. $200,000.00 $160,000.00
Income Tax .................. $76,000.00 $60,800.00
Preferred Dividends .......... 40,000.00 116,000.00 none 60,800.00
Balance Available for Com-
mon Stockholders ...... $ 84,000.00 $ 99,200.00
Looking at it from another viewpoint, the corporation would have
to earn as much as $224,516.13, or $24,516.13 more, in order to
pay preferred dividends and still have the same net amount left
for common stockholders, calculated as follows:
If Preferred Stock If Bonds
Issued Issued
Net Income before Interest or
Dividends ................. $224,516.13 $200,000.00
Bond Interest ................ none 40,000.00
Net Income Subject to In-
come Tax .............. $224,516.13 $160,000.00
Income Tax .................. $85,316.13 $60.800.00
Preferred Dividends .......... 40,000.00 125,316.13 none 60,800.00
Balance Available for Com-
mon Stockholders ...... $ 99,200.00 $ 99,200.00
From the standpoint of the individual providing the capital, of
course, the personal income tax would be the same without re-
gard to whether he received the $40,000 in the form of dividends
or as interest,43 although there would be an advantage to a cor-
poration providing the capital to take the payment as a dividend.
4
42 Ibid., § 13 and § 15.
43 Ibid., § 22(a).
44 Ibid., § 26(b).
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Also favoring the use of borrowed capital is the increased
resort to income bonds as a security device which has developed
in recent years. Bonds of this type, while characteristically used
in railroad reorganizations, are not limited to railroad borrow-
ers. Interest on such bonds is payable only if earned and does
not, under most of the bond contracts, accumulate as an obligation
of the issuer during those years in which the interest is not
earned.4 5 For the issuer, this type of security has many of the
favorable features of a non-cumulative preferred stock and, for
a new corporation, avoids the risk of financial embarrassment
and loss of credit standing because of failure to meet its contract
obligations during the unprofitable developmental period. The
use of the income bond device, under existing law, preserves the
income tax advantage of borrowing rather than selling stock"6
while at the same time giving the corporation most of the con-
tract advantages normally obtained only by selling stock. The
same advantages may be obtained, for corporations too small to
make bond financing feasible, by issuing promissory notes so
worded as to make the obligation to pay interest contingent upon
such interest being earned.
The encouragement given by the income tax law to debt
financing is unsound in theory and undesirable in practice. It is
also probable that the form of capital structure will not forever
be allowed to affect taxation to the same extent as at present.
Nevertheless, until the present tax procedure is changed, this
anomaly in the law will continue to lend impetus to borrowing
rather than to raising capital by the sale of stock.
45 Guthmann and Dougall, op. cit., pp. 171-5, 293, 681.
46 John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., - U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 299,
90 L. Ed. (adv.) 257 (1946). See earlier reports on this and the Talbot Mills case
in 1 T. C. 457 (1943) and 3 T. C. 95 (1944). The United States Supreme Court
upheld the rulings of the Tax Court in both cases after the Circuit Court of
Appeals had reversed the Tax Court in the Kelley case, 146 F. (2d) 466 (1944),
and had affirmed It in the Talbot Mills case, 146 F. (2d) 809 (1944). The ultimate
ruling was to the effect that whether interest on "Income bonds" is a tax deduction
depends upon the facts of each case and the bona tides of the transaction. Where
stock was reissued as "income bonds" solely to avoid taxes and the transaction
showed, as a whole, that the securities were a preferred stock in all but name,
the so-called "Interest" on them was held to be, in truth, a dividend and not de-
ductible. Where the income bonds were what the name implied, the interest was
held to be a tax deduction despite its non-cumulative nature.
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The lawyer advising his client with regard to the capital
structure of a new corporation should have some understanding
of the meaning of the term "leverage," or of "trading on the
equity," '4 7 as it is sometimes called. "Leverage" involves no
legal principles, but it is of great importance in its effect upon
the retention of corporate earnings by the organizers. "Lever-
age" involves the obtaining of capital by the sale of senior se-
curities having a fixed return, thereby magnifying the profits, or
losses, accruing to the residual common stock held by the or-
ganizers. Such senior securities may be bonds, notes, or non-
participating preferred stock. For "leverage" to operate to the
advantage of the common stockholders it is essential that the
capital obtained by the issuance of the senior securities can be
used to produce more income than must be paid out for the use
of such senior capital, and no greater amount of the senior se-
curities should be issued in any event than can be serviced in the
anticipated year of lowest earnings. If this principle is over-
looked, "leverage" can wipe out all profit to the common stock-
holders and rapidly bring the corporation to insolvency.
To illustrate the operation of "leverage," assume the or-
ganizers of Corporation "B" are contemplating the issuance of
$100,000 in common stock to themselves and anticipate the cor-
poration can earn $10,000 a year with that amount of capital,
or a return of 10%. The organizers are confident, however, that
they can, in the poorest year, earn an additional $10,000 if an-
other $100,000 capital is available to them. Assume further that
they can obtain this additional capital for a fixed payment of 4%.
If the organizers obtain the additional capital and their estimates
are realized, the earnings on their common stock will be increased
from 10% to 16%. Assuming operations in the first year are
precisely as the organizers anticipated, the effect of fluctuations
of earnings in subsequent years upon the rate of return on the
47 Guthmann and Dougall, op. cit., pp. 115-8; Gerstenberg, "Financial Organiza-
tion and Management of Business," (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1944), pp. 187-8.
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common stock because of the "leverage" provided by the senior
securities can be illustrated as follows:
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year
Earnings ..................... $20,000.00 $40,000.00 $80,000.00 $4,000.00
4% to Senior Securities ........ 4,000.00 4,000.00 4,000.00 4,000.00
Balance for Common Stock ..... $16,000.00 $36,000.00 $76,000.00 None
% Earned on Entire Capital.... 10% 20% 40% 2%
% Earned on Common Stock.... 16% 36% 76% 0%
The foregoing illustration demonstrates that the "leverage"
provided by the senior fixed-return securities tends to increase
substantially the fluctuation in the rate of return on the common
stock. If the company is prosperous and its earnings are in-
creasing rapidly, the common stockholders are greatly benefited
by the "leverage." Thus, in the third year of the illustration,
"leverage" gives them a 76% return on their investment instead
of the 40% return they would have realized if additional common
stock had been issued instead of the senior securities. On the
other hand, the fourth year shows the common stock return re-
duced to nothing, while, if more common had been issued instead
of the senior obligations, all common stock would have realized
a 2% return even in this poor year. With the senior securities
outstanding, any decline in earnings below $4,000 would wipe out
the common stockholders' equity in an amount equal to such
decline.
Every corporation must have outstanding a class of stock
which represents the residual ownership of the corporation,
typically known as common stock.48  It may comprise the only
class of stock outstanding, but if other classes are issued they
enjoy, by contract,49 some preferential rights over the residual
common stock. The common stock is generally that which the
organizers of the corporation retain, in whole or in part. The
profits realized by the corporation after paying interest on the
corporation's debt obligations and the contract return on other
48 Storrow v. Texas Consol. Compress & Mfg. Ass'n, 87 F. 612 (1898). See also
Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm. Ed., Vol. 19, § 8905.
49 Tennant v. Epstein, 356 Ill. 26, 189 N. E. 864 (1934) : Roth v. Ahrensfeld, 300
Ill. App. 312, 21 N. E. (2d) 21 (1939), affirmed in 373 Ill. 550, 27 N. E. (2d) 445
(1940).
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classes of stock accrue to the benefit of the common stock.50 The
converse is also true. If the corporation is unprofitable, it is the
interest of the common stock which is wiped out first. Upon
liquidation of the corporation, the common stockholders receive
only what is left after the debts and, in most cases, the other
classes of stock, have been paid in full. Common stock benefits
more than the other securities when the business is prosperous
and suffers the most when the business is depressed.
Next in seniority above the common stock is the preferred
stock.51 There has been a tendency in recent years to drop the
word "preferred" from the designation of this stock and to call
it "Capital Stock, Class A" and to designate the common stock
as "Capital Stock, Class B." If there are several series of shares
having preferences, the common stock may be classified by a letter
farther down in the alphabet, and the earlier letters may be used
to identify successive series of preferred stocks. Any class of
stock which enjoys special contract benefits is a preferred stock
irrespective of its designation. Like common stock, preferred
stock is never a debt of the corporation. 52 It represents part of
the ownership equity in the business, but its participation is de-
fined by the contract terms of its issuance53 very much in the
same manner as a special partner in a partnership is a part owner
but enjoys different contract rights from those enjoyed by the
general partners. The special contract rights given to preferred
stock issues are as varied as man's imagination. Some of the
more common provisions are discussed later in this section.
The indebtedness of a corporation is senior to all classes of
stock. Whether represented by bonds, by notes, or by less formal
obligations, the debt of a corporation represents its obligation to
pay, a credit obligation rather than an ownership.5 4  The liability
of the corporation to pay the principal of the obligation is abso-
0 General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N. J. Eq. 234, 100 A. 347
(1917).
51 In general, see Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm. Ed., Vol. 11, §§ 5283-5313.
52 Hamblock v. Clipper Lawn Mower Co., 148 Ill. App. 618 (1909).
53 See cases cited in note 49, ante.
54 In general, see United Lines Telegraph Co. v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
147 U. S. 431, 13 S. Ct. 396, 37 L. Ed. 231 (1893). See also 13 Am. Jur., Corpora-
tions, § 856.
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lute and not contingent; its liability to pay interest, rather than
dividends, is also absolute except when changed by contract as in
the peculiar income-bond contract.
The organizers of a corporation, since they normally plan to
hold all or the major part of the common stock, will seek to obtain
any additional outside capital on terms which will preserve to
the common stock as much of the corporate earning as possible.
If the business is of a stable nature and sure to produce a certain
minimum of earnings, it is possible that this outside capital can
be borrowed from a bank on corporate notes. This is probably
the most economical method. The interest will be at a low rate
if the business is such as to assure payment of the loan. The
interest paid will be a deduction in computing the corporation's
income tax. The formalities involved are at a minimum. Never-
theless, bank credit is seldom a practical source of permanent
capital for the new business, for the simple reason that few new
enterprises ai e so assured of success as to satisfy the bank's loan
officer. Moreover, bank loans generally are for a short period,
and the new business is rare which can pay interest on the loan
and also provide for the early payment of its principal.
Since new businesses generally require a few years of devel-
opment during which the profits are small, or even more likely
losses are incurred, it is almost an invitation to disaster for the
new corporation to raise any substantial part of its capital by
securities on which it has a certain and fixed obligation to pay
interest. The non-cumulative income bond or income note, bear-
ing a somewhat higher interest rate than would be paid on a
fixed-interest obligation of the debtor, so as to compensate for the
probable time lapse before interest will start to accrue and for-
the contingent nature of the interest obligation thereafter, meets
this problem satisfactorily where the corporation's prospects are-
good enough to make this type of obligation salable.
If the organizers are themselves able to put up all the re-
quired capital, but wish to withdraw part of their contribution
as soon as possible and to operate and expand the business from
its own profits, they can do this to their own greatest advantage
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by creating a capital structure composed of debt and common
stock securities. Each subscriber, for example, might be re-
quired to subscribe $1010.00 per unit for a "package" consisting
of one no-par share of common stock and one $1,000 interest-
bearing note. If the corporation profited, the interest on the
notes would constitute an income tax deduction for the corpora-
tion and, as soon as sufficient earnings had accumulated to permit
the continued operation of the business after paying off the notes,
the corporation could retire them. The money received by the
subscribers in payment of the notes would not constitute income
taxable to them, and their investment would have been reduced
from $1010.00 to $10.00 per unit subscribed. If the business did
not succeed, the subscribers would lose in proportion to their
original contributions but they would probably fare better than
if they had invested the same amounts in common stock for, if
anything at all was left to distribute, they would be entitled to
share as creditors upon the basis of the notes held.
If outside capital must be raised and the undertaking is not
such as to make debt financing possible, preferred stock may
be issued. The special rights and special limitations of preferred
stock must be spelled out in the contract. First, the stock may
be cumulative or non-cumulative. 55 If cumulative, the contract
dividend rate must be paid on the stock in each year and, if not
paid in any year, the amount for that year must be paid there-
after before any dividend may be paid on the common stock. The
arrearage on cumulative preferred stock is not a debt of the
corporation in the legal sense until declared as a dividend, but
as between the preferred and the common stockholders, the
arrearage must be paid to holders of the preferred shares before
any dividend may be paid on the common shares. If the pre-
ferred stock is non-cumulative, the contract dividend rate must
be paid on it in any year during which a dividend is paid on the
common stock, but if no dividend is paid on the common shares
in that year, the preferred dividend does not accumulate. Each
year is considered independently of prior years. The dividend
on the non-cumulative preferred shares does not have to be paid
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.14(b).
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even though earned when the common stock is paid no dividend
in that year, unless the failure to pay the non-cumulative pre-
ferred dividend is fraudulent or unconscionable.5 6 It is obvious
that, from the investor's standpoint, non-cumulative preferred
stock is a very unattractive security. Consequently, it is seldom
employed without other contract rights which strengthen its posi-
tion. Half way between cumulative and non-cumulative pre-
ferred stock is a type of preferred stock on which dividends are
cumulative if earned. If the corporate earnings are sufficient to
pay the preferred dividend, such dividend must be paid in the
following year or must be accumulated and paid thereafter be-
fore any dividend is paid on the common stock. New corporations
occasionally issue a preferred stock with a deferred cumulative
feature. This, in effect, is a preferred stock which is non-cumu-
lative during the developmental period or until a certain date is
reached or a certain condition has been met, but is cumulative
thereafter.
When necessary for its sale, preferred stock is often made
participating. 57 Under the usual procedure, if such stock is fully
participating, it is first entitled to a certain dividend payment;
next, the common shares are entitled to a like amount of dividend
per share; and after these payments to shares of both classes,
the balance to be declared is divided on an equal per share basis
between the two classes. The preferred stock may also be issued
as partially participating, or participating according to some
other special contract formula.
The salability of preferred stock may also be enhanced by
making it convertible at the option of the shareholder into com-
mon stock at a specified ratio. 5  From the organizers' stand-
point, this feature is a dangerous one for if the business proves
profitable the preferred stockholders, by converting their shares,
may obtain participation in the profits in excess of the preferred
dividend rate, thereby reducing the amounts accruing to the orig-
56 See note in 27 Col. L. Rev. 53 (1927), and see also Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm.
Ed., Vol. 12, § 5447; 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, §§ 689-95.
57 Fletcher, op. cit., Vol. 12, § 5448; 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, § 697. See also
Ill. Bus. Corp. Act Anno. (Foundation Press, Inc., Chicago, 1934), p. 74.
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.14(e).
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inal holders of common shares. From the investor's, the con-
vertible feature in preferred stock gives him a priority for the
preferred dividend rate plus an option on earnings in excess of
that rate if the business succeeds.
It is generally to the common stockholder's benefit to make
the preferred stock redeemable at the option of the corporation.'
To improve salability, the redemption price should be a small
percentage above the par value and above the original offering
price for the shares. The redemption feature permits the cor-
poration in future years either to refund the preferred at a lower
rate if the financial market permits, or to retire the same out-
right thereby preserving to the common shares the money which
would otherwise have to be paid on the preferred in the form
of dividends. It also permits the return of all voting power to
the common stock.
While preferred stock generally has preference over common
stock in the liquidation of the corporation, such preference arises
by contract only, so if not specified the preferred stock would
share only proportionately with other classes of stock.60 In that
regard, it is not unusual to find that different amounts may be
payable to the preferred stockholders on no-par value preferred
stock in case the liquidation is voluntary in contrast to an invol-
untary one.
These comments by no means exhaust the special contract
provisions which may be made with respect to preferred stock,
but merely indicate the principal provisions in common use. Fur-
thermore, any practical combination of these special provisions
is possible, so the organizers of the new corporation may decide
the issue "Cumulative, Fully Participating, Convertible and Re-
deemable Preferred Stock."
The Illinois Business Corporation Act permits the insertion
of a provision in the articles of incorporation limiting or deny-
ing the pre-emptive rights of shareholders of any class to acquire
59 Ibid., §157.14(a).
60 Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 156, 42 S. Ct. 540, 66 L. Ed.
871 (1922). See also Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm. Ed., Vol. 11, § 5303.
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additional shares of stock, if any are issued.61 If the pre-emptive
rights is not restricted in the articles, or by amendment, 62 all
shareholders are entitled to an opportunity to subscribe pro rata
to any new offering of stock and are thus enabled, if they so elect,
to retain their proportionate interest in the business. If the
organizers of a new corporation will have and retain voting con-
trol of it, the denial of the pre-emptive right can do them no harm
since they can control the manner of issuance of additional se-
curities by their votes. On the other hand, if the organizers are
forced to give up the voting control to others in order to obtain
additional capital, only by a preservation of the pre-emptive right
can they assure that their relative interest in the business will
not be reduced by subsequent issuance of additional stock and
its sale to persons other than themselves. If the organizers' con-
trol of corporate affairs is secure, the denial of pre-emptive rights
will make it possible to issue and sell stock in the future much
more easily and with less delay than if the corporation is forced
to solicit each shareholder before the additional stock can be
offered generally. The decision as to the retention or denial of
pre-emptive rights is thus one which touches upon profit partici-
pation, upon maintenance of the control of the corporation, and
upon the acquisition of additional capital in the future.
Where the stock of the new corporation is all to be held by
a few individuals, each of whom is actively employed in the cor-
porate business, it is desirable for the corporation to pay as lib-
eral salaries as earnings and good conscience permit to the
employee-owners. The amount paid out in salaries is not sub-
ject to the corporation income tax as are earnings paid out as
dividends. The salaries paid, however, must be fair. Federal
income tax regulations authorize the taxing officials to determine
what would be fair salaries and to allow no more than such fair
salaries to be deducted as business expense.8 3
61 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.24.
62 Ibid., § 157.52(o).
63 Income Tax Reg. No. 111, § 29.23(a)-6.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
B. RETENTION OF CONTROL
The second basic business purpose of the organizers of a
new corporation is to retain in themselves a sufficient voting con-
trol of the corporation. Large corporations are frequently con-
trolled by only a very small percentage of the total voting stock,
6 4
a fact made possible because the stock is usually widely distrib-
uted and there is no organized opposition. A large proportion
of the thousands of owners of small lots of the stock can be
counted upon not to take much interest in management so long
as dividends are forthcoming, and to acquiesce in, and to consent
by proxy to, the proposals of the owners of larger blocks of the
stock. The inertia of the unorganized stockholders tends to per-
petuate the control of those previously active in determining poli-
cies, even though the owners of the small lots of stock have, in
the aggregate, substantially more than a majority of the votes.
The same is not true, however, for the small new corporation.
Generally the stockholders of the new corporation, whether they
hold preferred or common stock, keep in close touch with devel-
opments in the business and show a keen interest in the operation
of the new undertaking. For the organizers to be secure in their
control of the new corporation, therefore, it is necessary, that
they be able to cast more than fifty per cent. of the vote.
In an earlier section, attention was called to the effect on
voting power of the issuance of stock of different par values and
of the issuance of several classes of no-par stock for different
amounts of consideration. One share of $100 par value stock
and an aggregate of ten shares of $10 par value stock might have
identical contract rights as to dividends, liquidation, and the
like; nevertheless, the former would enjoy but one vote while
the same aggregate value in the $10 par value shares would enjoy
ten votes. Since the organizers' interest is generally represented
by common stock, this observation suggests that organizers' con-
trol can best be assured by issuing shares to obtain outside cap-
ital for a larger consideration per share than is paid per share
for the common stock. The one vote represented by one share
64 Gerstenberg, op. cit., p. 113.
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of $100 par value preferred stock is not much threat to common
stockholders who have acquired no par value common stock for
a consideration of $5 per share, giving them twenty votes for
each $100 of consideration. At first impression, the shifting of
voting control in this manner appears unfair. Yet many statutes
in states other than Illinois require only that at least one class
of stock shall be voting, and other classes of shares may be given
no voting power whatsoever.6 5 Before condemning the practice
of limiting the voting strength of shares issued to obtain outside
capital, it must be borne in mind that the shares issued to the
outsiders generally are safeguarded by privileges, priorities and
peculiar rights not possessed by the common shares. Moreover,
before purchasing shares which possess only limited voting power,
the prudent investor will investigate the reliability of the per-
sons who will exercise control over the affairs of the corporation.
Generally such investors are less interested in having a voice in
the management than in the safeguards contained in the contract
under which their preferred shares are issued.
Section 146 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act66 sug-
gests another method whereby control may be retained by the
organizers even though they have less than fifty per cent. of the
voting shares. That section reads:
Whenever, with respect to any action to be taken by the
shareholders of a corporation, the articles of incorporation
require the vote or concurrence of the holders of a greater
proportion of the shares, or of any class or series thereof,
than required by this Act with respect to such action, the
provisions of the articles of incorporation shall control.
Taking this language at face value, it would appear possible to
provide in the articles of incorporation that a two-thirds majority
shall be necessary to elect a director and that a similar majority
be required to amend the articles of incorporation. Such a pro-
vision would enable the holders of anything more than one-third
of the voting stock to prevent the election of new directors, thereby
.5 See, for example, Dela. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 65, § 2045.
66 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.146.
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causing existing directors to continue in office.67  The existence
of the right to cumulate votes for directors0 8 may limit the ef-
fectiveness of this method of minority control, but does not render
it impossible.
If the organizers have voting control of the corporation at the
outset, the denial of the right of pre-emption6 9 will also prevent a
reduction of that control unless they consent thereto, since they
can do whatever is necessary to assure that new stock is not
issued in such manner or in such amounts as to dilute their voting
strength. But there is danger, if that control may or does pass
to others, that the same denial of pre-emptive rights may result
in the organizers' voting strength being further reduced by the
issuance of additional voting shares to others thereby preventing
the organizers from maintaining their relative voting strength.
Stock purchase options, often given with preferred stock or
bonds to add to their sales appeal, may sometimes be employed
by the organizers of a corporation in such a manner as to permit
the organizers to increase their voting power in future periods
should that become desirable. 70  Under such a plan, the corpora-
tion authorizes the issuance of stock purchase warrants to the
organizers either in compensation for services, or as an addi-
tional feature of the common shares purchased. These warrants
may provide that the warrant holder shall have the right, at his
option, to buy at a fixed or changing price a certain amount of
additional stock, authorized but not issued, for each warrant held,
provided the option is exercised within a stated period of time.71
67 Although Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. (2d) 829 (1945),
a four to three decision, indicates that a by-law requiring the unanimous vote of
stockholders to elect directors would be invalid under New York law, that state
has no provision comparable to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.146.
G8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.28.
69 Ibid., § 157.24.
70 The Securities Commissioners of ten states, Illinois included, have adopted a
statement of policy in this regard which reads, in part, as follows: "Warrants or
stock purchase options to those other than the purchasers of securities will here-
after be looked upon with great disfavor and will be considered as a basis for
denial of the application except in unusual Instances, and the burden shall always
rest upon the applicant to justify their issuance. The number of warrants sought
to be issued, the exercisable price, the term in which they are exercisable and the
absence or adequacy of a step-up rate In the exercisable price will all be taken into
consideration." See 131 C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Service 201.
71 Gerstenberg, op. cit., pp. 149-54.
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The option price should be above the value of the shares at the
time the warrants are given. If the business prospers and the
price of the stock rises above the option price, these stock pur-
chase warrants will have considerable value since their exercise
will enable the holder to acquire additional stock at very attrac-
tive terms. But, aside from the financial gain, the organizer
will be in a position to acquire additional voting power when
he purchases additional stock through the exercise of the option.
If all of the common stock is issued with stock purchase warrants
attached and all of these warrants are exercised, the value per
share of all of the common stock will be diluted so that each
common shareholder will have no greater proportionate interest
in profits than he had before any warrants-were exercised, but
the result will be to add new capital to the business as well as
to create greater relative voting power in the common stock as
compared with other classes of stock. The use of stock purchase
warrants in the financial plan must, however, be accompanied
by full disclosure thereof to all persons acquiring securities of
any class, and the plan must be fair and reasonable.7 2 It should
also be remembered that the existence of such warrants compli-
cates the capital structure of the corporation, ties up a substan-
tial amount of unissued stock, and may make it more difficult to
effect additional financing in the future. Because of these and
other disadvantages, the issuance thereof is advisable only when
other devices cannot be employed.
Even though a financial plan has been worked out which
gives majority control to the organizers of the corporation, there
is always the danger that one of them may sell all or part of his
stock to outside interests and thereby disrupt the scheme for
control. This danger may be minimized by placing restrictions
upon the right of alienation. Although the law does not look
with favor on such provisions, 73 Illinois courts have permitted
reasonable restraints on alienation since the adoption of the Uni-
72 See note 70, ante.
73 McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 63 Ill. App. 593 (1895), affirmed in 164 I11. 427,
45 N. E. 954 (1897), and Finch v. Macoupin Telephone and Telegraph Co., 146 Il.
App. 158 (1908), illustrate the older view.
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form Stock Transfer Act,7 4 so a charter provision might be held
reasonable and legal which required that any stockholder who
ceased to be an officer or employee of the corporation must first
offer his stock for sale to the corporation or to the other share-
holders before disposing of the same without restriction.75
Where additional voting stock has been issued to interests
friendly to the organizers, the organizers may often enlarge their
voting control by obtaining proxies to vote the shares owned by
such interests. Proxies must be "executed in writing by the
shareholder or by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact,' '7 but
any additional voting strength thus obtained represents nothing
more than a temporary arrangement. The shareholder may
terminate the authority of the proxy to vote his shares, unless
the proxy be coupled with an interest, by express revocation, by
giving a second proxy on a subsequent date, or by appearing at
the shareholders' meeting and claiming the right to vote in per-
son.77  Moreover, unless otherwise expressly provided, the proxy
becomes invalid eleven months after the date of its execution, 78
and an irrevocable proxy has been held to be against public policy
and void.79  If subsequent solicitation of proxies becomes neces-
sary and is made by the corporation itself at a time when the
74 People v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924) ; People ex rel. Malcolm v. Lake
Sand Corp., 251 Ill. App. 499 (1929). Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 430, declares that "there shall be no lien in favor
of a corporation upon the shares represented by a certificate issued by such cor-
poration and there shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so repre-
sented by virtue of any by-laws of such corporation, or otherwise, unless the right
of the corporation to such lien or the restriction is stated upon the certificate."
75 See Ill. Opin. Atty. Gen., 1935, No. 846, p. 278. That opinion was requested by
the Secretary of State on a charter provision which required that any stockholder
who ceased to be an officer or employee of the corporation had to offer this stock
to the corporation for a period of ninety days at a price determined by a stated
formula and if the corporation failed to purchase the stock, other shareholders
should have the right to purchase at the same terms during an additional ninety
days, and only after the two periods had elapsed could the shareholder dispose of
his stock without restriction. While holding the restriction valid, the opinion
pointed out that it could apply only to shares represented by certificates contain-
ing appropriate language and could not apply to shares previously issued without
the restrictive language as the right of alienation could not be restricted without
the shareholder's consent.
76 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.28.
77 Attempts to limit the right to vote by proxy have been rejected: People ex rel.
Snapp v. Younger, 238 Ill. App. 502 (1925). See also Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm.
Ed., Vol. 5, 5 2062.
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.28.
79 Laughlin v. Johnson, 230 Ill. App. 25 (1928).
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corporation's securities are registered on a securities exchange,
the corporation must also send out any proxy forms which a
stockholder may submit for that purpose provided he agrees to
defray the expense.80
The device of the voting trust provides still another method
for protecting control. Under it, certain shareholders who own
all or a majority of the common stock enter into a trust agree-
ment pursuant to which they transfer the legal title to their shares
to a trustee, or trustees, and take back voting trust certificates.
Dividends received by the trust are distributed to the holders of
these certificates in proportion to their contribution of stock to
the trust. The trustees, generally constituting the existing man-
agement of the corporation, vote the stock held by the trust after
the same has been transferred into the names of the trustees on
the books of the corporation. Although the voting trust certifi-
cates are generally freely transferable, the transferee takes
the certificate subject to the provisions of the trust agreement. 8'
This device is useful as it prevents potential change in manage-
ment in the event of the transfer of voting stock to new owners
while at the same time permitting the accumulation of the voting
strength of scattered small holdings of stock which might not be
voted at all if such holdings were not brought into the trust.
There are limitations upon its use, however, for voting trust cer-
tificates are classed as "securities" in the federal Securities Act
of 1933,82 and if either the certificates or the stock deposited in
the trust is listed on a securities exchange, the certificates are
also subject to the provisions of the federal Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.83
The Illinois Business Corporation Act has no provision lim-
iting the use of voting trusts and voting agreements.8 4  The
present legal status of such arrangements is left in some doubt
by the opinions of the Illinois courts, but it is quite apparent
80 15 U. S. C. A. § 78n; 2 C. C. H. Fed. Securities Law Service 25,606.
81 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm. Ed., Vol. 5, §§ 2075-95.
82 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b(1).
83 Ibid., § 78c(10).
84Il. Bus. Corp. Act Anno. (The Foundation Press. Inc., Chicago, 1934), pp.
125-7.
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that the trend of judicial opinion in Illinois is toward a more
liberal viewpoint.5 5 The most strict interpretation is that given
in Luthy v. Ream8 6 where it was held that the beneficial owners in
whom legal title to the shares had once become vested could not
surrender their legal title to a trustee so as to give him the ab-
solute power to vote the stock independently of any control by
them, for then the trust would be invalid as amounting to an
irrevocable proxy not coupled with an interest and violative of
Article XI of the Illinois Constitution. There are decisions, both
before8 7 and after"" the decision in Luthy v. Ream, which would
appear to limit the application of the rule expressed in that case,
and one court has even suggested89 that the holding therein has
been overruled by the decision in Babcock v. Chicago Railways
Company9 0
One thing is evident and that is that the facts of each case
will have much to do with how strictly the Illinois courts will
limit the use of voting trusts. Where, because of reorganization
or otherwise, the shares are issued directly to the trustee without
first vesting in the persons having the beneficial interest, the
voting trust may be held valid even though the trustee has abso-
lute discretion in voting the stock without any control by the
beneficial owners. 91 Where the voting trust is a pooling arrange-
ment under which the trustee must vote all of the shares as a
unit as directed by a majority of the beneficial owners, the trust
is not bad since the mutual promises by the beneficial owners to
permit their shares to be voted according to the wishes of the
85 See note in 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 640 (1936).
86 270 11l. 170, 110 N. E. 373, Ann. Cas. 1917B 368 (1915).
87 Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E. 949 (1913); Faulds v.
Yates, 57 Il1. 416, 11 Am. Rep. 24 (1870) ; Gray v. Bloomington & Normal Ry., 120
Ill. App. 159 (1905).
88 Babcock v. Chicago Ry. Co., 325 Ill. 16, 155 N. E. 773 (1927); Thompson v.
J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N. E. 648, Ann. Cas. 1917E 591
(1917) ; Kann v. Rosset, 307 Ill. App. 153, 30 N. E. (2d) 204 (1940) ; Boyle v. John
M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill. App. 57 (1928); Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 11. App. 343
(1926). Gumbiner v. Alden Inn, 389 111. 273, 59 N. E. (2d) 648 (1945), involved a
voting trust of shares in a Delaware corporation.
89 Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill. App. 57 (1928), at p. 82.
90 325 Ill. 16, 155 N. E. 773 (1927).
91 Babcock v. Chicago Ry. Co., 325 I1. 16, 155 N. E. 773 (1927).
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majority constitutes sufficient consideration. 92  For the voting
trust to be irrevocable, or irrevocable for a fixed period of time,
the trustee's voting right must be coupled with an interest in the
stock itself.93  Agreements among all stockholders of closed cor-
porations are likely to receive more liberal recognition than those
of corporations whose stock is widely held. 94  Where only a ma-
jority of the stockholders make an agreement for the election of
directors, such agreements have been held enforceable. 95
The most liberal view of voting agreements in Illinois appears
to be that expressed by the Appellate Court in the case of Boyle
v. John M. Smyth Comnpany96 where the court held enforceable
an agreement among five stockholders holding a majority of the
stock under which they assigned the stock to themselves as trus-
tees and took non-transferable receipts which could be sold only
to parties to the agreement and subject to its terms. Dividends
were to be paid to the receipt holders. The trust agreement was
to continue in force for twenty years and was to bind the suc-
cessors, heirs, and assigns of the parties. The heirs of one of
the parties were denied the right to withdraw stock from the trust.
If any comprehensive conclusion may be taken from the decisions
on voting trusts and agreements, it is that the validity thereof
largely depends upon the peculiar facts of each case and that in
deciding whether a particular arrangement is valid or invalid
the primary factors to be taken into account are (1) the existence
92 Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E. 949 (1913) ; Faulds v.
Yates, 57 1l. 416, 11 Am. Rep. 24 (1870) ; Gray v. Bloomington & Normal Ry., 120
Ill. App. 159 (1905). See also note in 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 640 (1936).
93 Babcock v. Chicago Ry. Co., 325 Ill. 16, 155 N. H. 773 (1927).
94 Hladovec v. Paul, 222 Ill. 254, 78 N. E. 619 (1906); People ex rel. Rudaitis v.
Galskis, 233 Il1. App. 414 (1924).
95 Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N. E. 648, Ann.
Cas. 1917E 591 (1917).
96 248 Ii. App. 57 (1928). Cook on Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol. 2, § 622f, states:
"The above decisions seem to lead to the conclusion that a deposit of certificates
of stock with trustees for a specified period of time, either with or without a
transfer of the same to the trustees, is legal, and is not in violation of the usual
statute against restraints on the alienation of personal property; and is not opposed
to public policy as a restraint upon trade; and is not an implied fraud upon stock-
holders who are not allowed to participate; and is not an illegal separation of the
voting power from the ownership of the stock; provided always that no actual
fraud is involved in the transaction. In other words, such a pooling of stock is
not illegal in itself, but, like all contracts, may be illegal if actual fraud is
involved."
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of consideration for the surrender of the voting power; (2) the
coupling of the voting power with an interest in the stock itself;
and (3) the absence of fraud or of an illegal or improper purpose.
C. ECONOMY IN ACQUIRING INITIAL CAPITAL.
After an estimate has been made of the amount of initial
capital which will be required by the new enterprise to cover
promotion and organization expenses, the acquisition of the fixed
plant and equipment, adequate working capital for inventories
and receivables, and a liberal provision for contingencies, 97 a de-
cision must be made as to how the money can be raised most
economically. While this is primarily a matter of business de-
cision rather than a legal question, there are certain matters in
this connection which are the lawyer's responsibility.
If the issue offered to the public is less than $300,000, or if
the securities are to be sold only to residents of the state of in-
corporation and where the corporation does business, the issue
need not be formally registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 8 If the number of persons who are to subscribe
the capital does not exceed twenty-five, or if the total amount of
capital to be raised does not exceed $25,000 and the sale of the
securities is to be effected without expense or the payment of
commissions, compliance with the Illinois Securities Law for the
pre-incorporation sale of securities will be unnecessary. 99 These
registration requirements should be kept in mind by the lawyer
at all times for, if it is possible to effect the financing without
registering the securities, a substantial saving in the cost of ac-
quiring the capital will usually result. 1°°
It should also be remembered that credit securities such as
bonds, notes, and other debtor obligations, are less expensive to
float, as a rule, than are equity securities like preferred and com-
97 See Gerstenberg, op. cit., pp. 11-41.
98 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c.
9 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 121%, § 99.
100 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Statistical Series, Release No. 744,
entitled "Cost of Floatation of Equity Securities by Small Companies."
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mon stocks. 101 This fact is due, in part, to the larger denomina-
tion and price per unit, the smaller risk to the underwriter, and
the greater salability of large blocks of credit securities as com-
pared with stocks. Consideration of the condition of the capital
market at the time the securities are to be sold and the cost and
manner of distribution of such securities are business matters
and are not generally the responsibility of the lawyer. 0 2  The
organizers may need to be warned on these points, however, or
they may defeat one of their basic purposes if the cost of acquir-
ing capital comes too high.
D. FLEXIBILITY IN CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
One writer on the subject of the financial organization of a
business has stated:
When a company is about to issue securities, it ought to con-
sider, before it selects the form of securities to be issued, the
effect of the proposed securities not only on the company
and its credit at the moment of issue, but on the value of
other securities, on the possibility of issuing other securities
in the future, on the availability of future earnings for divi-
dends to keep up the company's investment credit position,
and on the possibility of rearranging the financial structure
of the company in the future. 103
The lawyer's responsibility with respect to securing flexibility
in the capital structure is, therefore, largely one of negatives.
He should discourage the placing of unnecessarily restrictive
provisions in the contracts of the initial securities which may
prevent subsequent issues. A provision in a bond or note inden-
ture whereby future borrowing must be done with securities junior
to those outstanding may prevent raising capital at a time when
new capital is essential to save the enterprise from financial ruin.
lo Securities and Exchange Commission, Statistical Series, Release No. 13. A
summary thereof is contained in Gerstenberg, op. cit., p. 371.
102 An excellent discussion of these points is contained in Gerstenberg, op. cit.,
Ch. XX, XXI, and XXII.
103 Gerstenberg, op. cit., p. 334.
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A provision sharply restricting the payment of dividends on
stock issues so long as the credit securities are outstanding may
prevent the sale of new stock at a time when that would be the
most beneficial method of raising capital.
He should avoid creating a complicated capital structure, 10 4
for prospective purchasers will shy away from the purchase on
new securities when it is necessary to analyze in detail the rights
the new securities will have in relation to several outstanding
issues of securities. If the business is of a type which may have
sudden need for new capital, he should negative the pre-emptive
right of the initial issues of stock105 so that additional stock may
be sold without the delay occasioned by having first to solicit the
existing stockholders. He should secure authorization in the
original articles of incorporation for so much stock in addition
to that which is to be sold initially as will meet the probable needs
of new stock financing in the early period of operation, 10 6 or he
should provide for simple and speedy authorization of additional
stock by amendment of the articles. 10 7 If long term debt or pre-
ferred stock is to be issued upon organization, it is usually de-
sirable to provide that such securities may be redeemed at the
option of the corporation'"8 so as to permit refinancing on more
favorable terms, or retirement if the business experience of the
company renders that expedient.
Beyond these simple observations it is scarcely necessary to
go. The lawyer, like the organizer, must use his common sense
to avoid creating a capital structure which, though adapted to
the immediate needs, overlooks the fact that the business enter-
prise is not static but constantly changing. If the company en-
counters bad times, there must be room in the capital structure
to add a new type of security which provides every safety feature
which the company can marshal; if the company is successful
beyond expectation, there must be room to obtain the additional
104 Ibid., p. 335.
L05 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.24.
106 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.47, particularly subsections (f) and (i).
107 Ibid., § 157.52(d).
108 Ibid., § 157.14(a).
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capital for its expanding business by offering such type of new
securities as may be most advantageous to the company and its
owners.
III. CONCLUSIONS.
The lawyer whose advice is sought as to the formation of
the capital structure of a new corporation must know more than
what is legal and what is not. He must also understand enough
of corporate finance to advise his clients as to what is desirable
among the devices legally available. He must know enough of
tax law to be able to avoid undue tax burdens on the new enter-
prise. He must have at least an over-all understanding of the
application of the federal and state securities laws. He must
know how to avoid, insofar as possible, the special burdens which
affect the corporate form of organization. He must know how
best legally to arrange the capital structure so as to achieve the
business purposes of his clients.
He should recognize that the provisions of the Illinois Busi-
ness Corporation Act are more procedural than substantive and
therefore see that most legitimate ends can be attained under its
provisions, although the methods to be followed in attaining those
results may be limited. In contrast, he should note that the pro-
visions of the Illinois Securities Law, and of the federal laws
regarding securities, are more sharply restrictive of substance
as well as procedure. While the discretion given to administrative
agencies under such securities legislation permits each case to
be dealt with more or less individually within the framework of
the legislation itself, these laws are designed primarily to pre-
vent fraud on the security purchaser, and to shift the emphasis
from caveat emptor to caveat vendor.
He should shape the corporate capital structure so as to
preserve to his clients as much of the profit and control of the
business as is legitimately practicable yet so arrange it that out-
side capital may be obtained economically in the first instance
and without unnecessary difficulty if required in later phases of
the corporation's existence. He should be alert to tax savings
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arising from the issuance of credit securities rather than pre-
ferred or common stock, but should avoid burdening the new en-
terprise with heavy fixed charges in its early years of operation.
Even if the organizers are to supply all of the capital, he should
recognize the substantial tax savings that can be effected by is-
suing a combination of stock and notes in exchange for such cap-
ital. He should observe the wisdom, if outside capital is obtained,
to make the securities issued redeemable at the option of the
corporation or at least deny the right of pre-emption.
He should not overlook the question of voting control al-
though, in large corporations whose shares are to be widely dis-
tributed, he may recognize the possibilities inherent in minority
control by a strongly-organized minority group. Despite the fact
that the Illinois law requires that all classes of stock be voting
stock, he should understand how it is possible for the majority
of voting strength to be held by those who have invested less than
a majority of the capital. He should not be unaware of the fact
that the law permits reasonable restraints on the alienation of
stock and, by the judicious use of such restraints, sanctions the
preservation of control against the risk of sale to an outsider.
He might even toy with the thought of a voting trust or a voting
agreement, for while their status, under Illinois decisions, is not
clearly defined they may be used to effect voting control under
certain conditions.
Above all, he should endeavor to arrange a capital structure
for the new corporation that is as simple as possible, while ex-
ercising due care to save his clients from the delay and expense
of registration under the state and federal securities legislation
if the particular situation permits financing to be effected in
such a manner as to be exempt from such requirements. Within
these limits, his competent advice may well be the distinguishing
factor between success and failure for the new enterprise.
